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The main purpose of  this paper is to analyze the major effects of population 
aging on the macroeconomic savings and investment balance in Japan and to 
discuss their major policy implications. Although population aging is a phe- 
nomenon common to many OECD countries, Japan’s case is striking because 
of the high rate at which it is progressing. The rapid aging process in Japan is 
a product of the high rate of economic growth and associated changes in family 
and social structures in the postwar period, which has resulted in a large de- 
cline in the fertility rate and a marked lengthening of the average life expec- 
tancy. 
The rapid aging of  the population  has important macroeconomic effects. 
The first effect is the impact on the labor market through a shrinking labor 
force and an increasing share of older workers in the labor force. The second 
is the impact on the capital market due to falling household and national sav- 
ings  ratios,  coupled  with  the rising  ratio of  retired  people  to  working-age 
people. In addition, a shrinking labor force will affect investment and thus the 
financing of  capital. The third effect is the fiscal impact, with an increasing 
share of the elderly causing substantial transfers of income from the working 
to the retired  generation through the tax and social security systems. These 
impacts eventually affect both investment and savings, and thus the  current 
external account. 
In this paper, we focus on the impact of population aging on macroeconomic 
savings and investment balances mainly through the labor market. While Ja- 
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pan’s huge trade  surplus is the cause of various  economic  frictions, a trade 
deficit could bring about another problem, adversely affecting not only Japan 
but the world economy as well through the curtailment of Japan’s capital ex- 
ports. In the sections that follow, we look at the development of the population 
structure and the labor force in the coming decades. This overview is followed 
by  a review of previous empirical studies of the economic impacts of popula- 
tion aging, most of which have reached pessimistic conclusions, and an attempt 
to identify the major factors behind these conclusions. We also explore various 
alternative conclusions  under different  assumptions. Finally, we discuss the 
policy implications of population aging. 
3.1  Aging of the Population and Labor Force 
Japan’s strong economic performance in the past may be explained partly by 
its low dependency ratio-that  is, the ratio of the population younger than 15 
years (young) or older than 64 years (elderly) to the total population. In the 
early phase of  the population aging process, the rapid decline in the fertility 
rate resulted in a decrease in the young population that exceeded the increase 
in the elderly population, thus lowering the total dependency ratio. It is not a 
coincidence  that Japan and Germany (the former Federal  Republic  of  Ger- 
many), which had the lowest total dependency ratios of the major OECD coun- 
tries, also had the best economic performance until very recently (fig. 3.1A). 
For this reason, the rapidly progressing aging of the population will be a major 
challenge for Japan in the coming decades. 
There are two aspects to population aging: one is the increase in the propor- 
tion of the elderly in the total population, and the other is the slower growth of 
the population coupled with a decrease in the labor force arising directly from 
the  falling  fertility  rate.  While  the  former  affects  economic  performance 
mainly through redistribution of income, for example, by increasing the social 
security burden and benefits, the latter has a more direct impact on economic 
growth by reducing the labor force, a major factor in production. 
3.1.1  Increasing Ratio of the Elderly 
Two major factors fostering population aging are declining fertility rate and 
extension of life expectancy. In Japan, the total fertility rate (i.e., the average 
number of births per woman in her lifetime) rapidly fell from 4.5 in 1950 to 
2.1 in the 1970s.  After stabilizing temporarily, it fell again during the 1980s to 
1.50 in  1994. The falling fertility rate will soon be reflected in a decreasing 
working-age population (i.e., those between  15 and 64 years of age), which is 
likely to begin falling in 1995. Although the Institute of Population Problems 
(IPP) of the Ministry of Health and Welfare projects that the fertility rate will 
recover after reaching its low in 1995, there are more pessimistic views of the 
recovery of fertility (Ogura, chap. 1 in this volume). If the fertility rate stays at 
the current low level through the  1990s, the process of population aging will 
accelerate even faster than currently projected. 61  Population Aging and the Savings-Investment Balance in Japan 
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Fig. 3.1  A, International comparison of dependency ratios, 1965-2025;  I?, 
Japanese dependency ratios by age group, 1965-2025 
Sources: A, Bos et al. (1992); B,  Ministry of Health and Welfare (1992). 
Life expectancy for 65-year-olds has risen by 4.51 years for males and 6.37 
years for females over the past four decades.'  Japan's life expectancy growth 
and the level attained in  1994 were the highest in the world. Improvement in 
medical  services and in the incomes of the elderly contributed to the longer 
lives of the Japanese. This extension in life expectancy for 65-year-olds since 
1955 raised the proportion of the elderly (defined as those aged 65 years and 
over) in the total population in 1990 by over 2 percent and accounts for approx- 
imately one-fifth of  the increase in the ratio projected for 2025.' 
With falling fertility and rising life expectancy, the ratio of the elderly to the 
working-age population  is expected  to double from the current level by  the 
year 2025 (fig. 3.1B). The extent to which population aging will have negative 
impacts on the economy is a matter of great concern. 
1. The extension of life expectancy at birth during the same period is more significant because 
of  a large fall in infant mortality: 14.35 years for males and 16.81 years for females. 
2. If we assume that the life expectancy for 65-year-olds is unchanged-is.,  that the probability 
of  survival in each age cohort has been unchanged  since  1955-the  old-age dependency ratio 
would have been 10.1 percent instead of 12.1 percent in 1990,  and it would be 20.6 percent instead 
of 25.8 percent in 2025. 62  Naohiro Yashiro and Akiko Sat0 Oishi 
Table 3.1  Projection of the Labor Force (million) 
Growth Rate per Annum (%) 
Population  1970  1980  1990  2000  2010  1970-1990  1990-2000  2000-2010 
Total  51.7  56.7  63.8  67.4  66.0  1.06  0.55  -0.21 
Male  31.4  34.8  37.9  39.8  38.5  0.95  0.49  -0.33 
Female  20.3  21.9  25.9  27.6  27.5  1.23  0.64  -0.04 
Aged 15-24  11.6  7.3  8.3  7.4  5.9  -1.66  -1.14  -2.24 
Aged55-64  5.6  6.5  9.3  10.4  11.6  2.57  1.12  1.10 
Source; Economic Planning Agency (1991a) 
Note: Projections beyond the year 1990 are made assuming an increase in the female labor force 
participation rate. 
3.1.2  Decreasing Labor Force 
The effects of  a decrease in the working-age population in Japan will be 
partly offset by  higher female labor force participation. Japan’s female labor 
force participation rate was 50.0 percent in  1995, low by  international stan- 
dards. A major characteristic of the female participation rate in Japan is its M- 
shaped pattern, produced by  a sharp decline in women’s participation during 
their childbearing years, between the ages of 25 and 40. However, the ratio of 
those who wish to work to those who do not work is highest in this age group, 
indicating that this will be a large source of labor in the near future. Toward 
the year 2025, this potential labor force is likely to find work under tightening 
labor market conditions and will raise the working-age female participation 
rate. 
According to the projection of  the Economic Planning Agency  (1991a), 
however,  even  accounting for higher female labor  force participation, the 
growth rate of  the labor force will decline from  1.1 percent per annum in 
1970-80  to 0.6 percent on average in the 1990s and will turn negative in the 
following decade. Beyond the year 2000, the decrease in the male labor force 
will be more significant, particularly in the younger generation, indicating a 
rapid change in the structure of the labor force (table 3.1). 
3.2  Review of Previous Studies on the Savings-Investment Balance 
Several long-term projections of  macroeconomic developments in Japan 
have been made. Some major methods used to project the economic effects of 
population aging are the Multi-Country Macroeconomic Model, the Neoclassi- 
cal Model, the Overlapping Generations Model, and the Turnpike Model.3  Al- 
though the techniques of  these models differ widely, how they deal with the 
3. For a detailed survey on the impact of demographic changes on long-term trends in the sav- 
ings rate, see Horioka (1992). 63  Population Aging and the Savings-Investment Balance in Japan 
following points is worth noting when evaluating the results: profitability  of 
capital,  endogenous  technological  change,  and  labor  supply  responses  to 
aging. Conclusions about the effects of aging depend on whether a model takes 
into account these effects associated with population aging. In the following 
paragraphs, we review previous studies, centering our attention on differences 
in their assumptions about the labor force and technological changes, as well 
as forces counteracting population aging. 
Masson and Tryon (1990) used the IMF Multi-Country Macroeconometric 
Model to determine the effect of population aging on the current external ac- 
counts of seven major OECD countries. The effects of  population aging are 
captured by the following path: first, consumption expenditure is stimulated 
by a falling savings rate; then the reduction of the labor force leads to a propor- 
tionate contraction of capital stock and potential output, leaving capital stock 
per worker constant; finally, increases in government expenditures expand ag- 
gregate demand. The combined effects of  the demographic  shifts will be as 
follows: The share in GNP of Japan’s private savings will fall by 4.3 percent 
from baseline during the 1995-2025  period, while that of gross private invest- 
ment will fall by  1.8 percent, resulting in persistent falls in the net external 
surplus. As population aging occurs earlier in Japan than in the United States, 
the U.S.-Japan  trade balance should move in favor of the United States in the 
coming decades. Although the model by Masson and Tiyon accounts for inter- 
actions between countries with different rates of aging, it assumes no changes 
in the labor force participation rate and no technological changes. Also, it is 
basically  a Keynesian-type model in the sense that increases in government 
expenditures lead to large aggregate demand, which is not an appropriate prop- 
erty for a long-term projection model. 
Auerbach et al. (1989) developed a general equilibrium-type  Overlapping 
Generations Model for four OECD countries (United States, Japan, Germany, 
and Sweden). Given the underlying life-cycle framework of the model, popula- 
tion  aging will result in a general decline  in the  national savings rates; the 
speed of decline will be most noticeable in Japan and will approach zero in the 
year 2025, when the ratio of the aged to the total population will reach a pla- 
teau. However, with the “open economy”  assumption of the paper-that  is, 
perfect international  capital  mobility-an  increase in the capital-labor  ratio 
arising from the rapid demographic shift in Japan will stimulate an outflow of 
capital to maintain the preexisting return on capital, resulting in an increasing 
current account surplus. In other words, the declining labor supply will lead to 
a proportionate reduction of domestic investment and thus will not bring about 
a deterioration of the external current account. 
Noguchi  ( 1990) explored the Neoclassical Model, based on the life-cycle 
theory of savings and the Cobb-Douglas production function. The basic sce- 
nario of the paper is that, while national savings will decline gradually, so will 
business investment, as the return on capital falls with increasingly scarce la- 
bor. Although Noguchi accounted for labor-augmenting technological change, 64  Naohiro Yashiro and Akiko Sato Oishi 
he assumed that the rate will remain unchanged despite the decrease in  the 
labor force. In addition, he did not account for labor supply responses to popu- 
lation aging in the model. Based on this model, the current external surplus in 
Japan is expected to remain unchanged through the 1990s, to increase in the 
2000-2010  period, and to decline only after the year 2010. 
Horioka (1991, 1992) made a single-equation analysis of Japan’s savings rate 
in conjunction with the age structure of the population and used the estimated 
regression coefficients to project its future trends. Explanatory variables are 
the  old-age  dependency  ratio  (AGE) and  the  young-age  dependency  ratio 
(DEP), which are the ratios of the population aged 65 years and over and the 
population aged 19 years and under to the population aged 20-64  years, re- 
spectively. A major conclusion of Horioka’s projection is that Japan’s private 
savings ratio (both household and corporate sector) will become negative after 
the year 2007 with rapid population aging. 
The Economic Planning Agency (1991b) published a long-term projection 
of the Japanese economy based on a Turnpike “optimal growth” ModeL4 The 
national savings rate will decline gradually, with changes in time preferences 
due to the demographic shift. Aggregate investment also will decline in  the 
1990s but will stay at the same level during the 2000-2010  period. These re- 
sults arise mainly because, based on the assumption of free mobility of labor 
across industries, the efficiency of  labor will improve with increasing  labor 
scarcity, particularly in the service sector, where relative labor productivity is 
particularly low. As a result, the current external balance will remain a surplus 
in the 1990s but will sustain a deficit from the year 2000. Given the projected 
stable growth in labor productivity, the decrease in the labor force will lead 
directly to a falling rate of economic growth; GDP growth is projected to fall 
from 4.2 percent in the 1980s to 3.75 percent in the 1990s and 2.75 percent in 
the period 2000-2010  (Yoshitomi and Yashiro 1992). 
Many previous studies agree that both savings and investment ratios to GNP 
are likely to fall as the population ages and that the relative speed is critical in 
determining the future path of the current external balance. Although the struc- 
tures and assumptions of the models discussed above differ significantly, the 
differences in the projections of savings, investment, and GNP depend on the 
extent  to  which  these  models  account  for feedback  effects  of  the  demo- 
graphic shifts. 
3.3  Feedback Effects of Population Aging 
The extent to which key macroeconomic variables, such as labor productiv- 
ity, savings, and investment, are affected by an aging population and the associ- 
ated decline in the growth rate of the labor force is crucial in forecasting eco- 
4. This is the Multi-Industry Linear Programming Model, which maximizes long-run household 
consumption subject to labor supply and technological constraints. Capital-labor ratios and input- 
output coefficients of respective industries are given exogenously, but they change over time, re- 
flecting technological progress. See Economic Planning Agency (1991b) for details of the model. 65  Population Aging and the Savings-Investment Balance in Japan 
nomic performance in the coming decades. Pessimistic views that population 
aging will greatly discourage the currently high savings and investment rates 
in Japan are often founded on the historical relationship between savings and 
investment, on one hand, and demographic changes, on the other. Those studies 
implicitly assume that both labor force participation and technological change 
are independent of population aging. 
However, past Japanese experiences  with oil price hikes in the 1970s and 
the substantial yen appreciation in the 1980s indicate that the economy readily 
adapts to external shocks. In this sense, whether or not mechanisms counter- 
acting external shocks are incorporated in the model will result in an entirely 
different picture of the coming “aged society” in Japan. As the labor supply 
becomes scarce with a declining fertility rate, more rapid technological change 
might be induced, partly offsetting the negative impact of population aging on 
savings  and  investment.  Thus, treating  the  labor supply  and technological 
change factors as endogenous rather than exogenous will alter the projections 
of savings and investment trends. 
3.3.1  Alternative Definition of the Elderly 
The projections for an economy under population aging are often pessimis- 
tic because with a decreasing labor force, the old-age dependency ratio will 
double between  1990 and 2025. However, this pessimistic  picture  is partly 
based on the conventional definition of the elderly-those  who are 65 years of 
age or older. The implicit assumption is that the labor force participation rates 
of older men and women will remain unchanged throughout the aging of soci- 
ety. This assumption may not be appropriate for Japan’s economy in the com- 
ing decades. 
The rate of labor force participation among the elderly in Japan has been 
high by international  standards. Participation rates for men aged 65-69  and 
aged 70 and over were 56.5 percent and 26.6 percent, respectively, which are 
much higher than the rates in the United States (table 3.2).  Although most large 
Japanese firms set the age of mandatory retirement, which is not against the 
Table 3.2  Labor Force Participation of the Elderly in Japan and the United 
States, 1992 
Japan  United States 
Total  Men  Women  Total  Men  Women 
Average (all ages)  64.0  77.9  50.7  66.3  75.6  57.8 
60-64  57.2  75.0  40.7  45.0  54.7  36.5 
65-69  41.4  56.5  29.3  20.7  25.9  16.2 
70+  16.6  26.6  10.7  7.1  12.1  6.3 
55-59  74.2  93.6  55.6  67.4  78.9  56.8 
Sources: For Japan, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labor Force 
Survey (Tokyo: Government Printing Office,  1992); for the United States, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Employmenr und Earnings (Washington, D.C., January 1993). 66  Naohiro Yashiro and Akiko Sato Oishi 
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Fig. 3.2  Labor force participation of the elderly in Japan 
Source: Ministry of Labor, Survey of Employment  Conditions of  Older Persons (Tokyo, 1988, 
1992). 
law in Japan, at 60 or under, many workers continue to work beyond retirement 
age by moving to smaller firms. Thus, there is only a small decline in participa- 
tion at age 60, and the rate falls gradually through the sixties (fig. 3.2).5 
Early retirement has increased in Japan. The labor force participation rate 
of men aged 60-64  declined from 81 percent in  1960 to 71 percent in  1988. 
Major factors behind this are the following: (1) The share of  self-employed 
men in the age group 60-69,  among whom labor force participation is higher 
than the average, has fallen over time with contractions in the agriculture and 
distribution sectors, and this decrease contributes to a lower participation rate 
for the elderly. (2) Improvements in pension benefits have stimulated I :tire- 
ment (for details, see Seike 1993). 
However, these factors encouraging early retirement are weakening. Indeed, 
the labor force participation rate of those 60 years of  age or older has risen 
since 1988, reflecting tighter labor market conditions. The tendency is more 
prominent among those who are in employee households; their participation 
rate rose from 37 percent in 1986 to 42 percent in 1991. The change in the age 
of eligibility for public pensions from the current 60 years to 65 as of the year 
5. One of the major factors affecting this high level of labor force participation of  those who 
are 60 years of age or older is the relatively large share of the self-employed in Japan. In 1991, the 
labor force participation  rate of  those who were 65  years old or over was 74  percent  in self- 
employed households and 42 percent in employee households. In 1993, self-employed and family 
workers accounted for 19 percent of the labor force, and the share rose to 47  percent for those 
aged 60 or older. 67  Population Aging and the Savings-Investment Balance in Japan 
2000 should aggravate this tendency.6  This is, in a sense, a rational reaction by 
Japanese employees to their increased life expectancy and is likely to continue 
during the 1990s. 
For this reason, the conventional definition of  the elderly, which fixes the 
“cutoff age” between the elderly and the nonelderly at 65, is misleading be- 
cause it implicitly assumes that the labor force participation of older workers 
will be unchanged despite longer life expectancy and an increasing need to 
finance prolonged retired lives. Although the speed of population aging in Ja- 
pan (which was far below the OECD level in the 1960s but is projected to be 
among the highest levels in 2025) is a major characteristic of the country, the 
rapid increase in this rate overstates the “true” aging process because the con- 
ventional definition, which considers everyone aged 65 or over as dependent 
elderly, accounted for only a minor portion of  the true elderly in the 1960s, 
when average life expectancy was close to 65 years of age. Also, it overstates 
the effects of aging in the twenty-first century because those aged 65 will be 
the “relatively young elderly” in 2025, when their life expectancy is further ex- 
tended. 
The life expectancy of the weighted average of males and females is pro- 
jected to rise from 79 years in 1990 to 82 years in 2025.7 Thus, we can set an 
alternative definition of “elderly” by shifting the boundary vis-8-vis the nonel- 
derly to take into account the extension of life expectancy at age 65.8  This new 
definition of the elderly applies what was the economic capability of a 65-year- 
old in 1955 to other periods that have increased life expectancy. If we apply 
the new definition to find the boundary of the elderly population, the elderly 
in  1990 were those aged 67 or over and in 2025 will be those aged 70 or over. 
According to this definition, the ratio of the elderly to the total population in 
the year 2025 will be 20.6 percent rather than the 25.8 percent conventionally 
used  (fig. 3.3). An economic implication  of  the alternative definition is the 
approximate ratio of the dependent population to the total population when the 
elderly are free to choose between work and retirement without the distortions 
of the tax and social security systems. Whether we apply a conventional defi- 
nition of the elderly based on the current institutions or an alternative one as- 
suming changes in social practices under the pressure of an aging population 
has important implications for the projection of the economic impact of popu- 
lation aging. 
6. In  1995, the government decided to gradually extend the pensionable age for Employees’ 
Pension Insurance from the current 60 years to 65, as of the year 2000. 
7. The average life expectancies of males and females in Japan were 75.92 and 81.90 years, 
respectively, in  1990 and are projected  to rise to 78.27 and 85.06 years, respectively, in 2025 
(Ministry of  Health and Welfare 1992). 
8. If we assume that the probability of survival for those aged 65 or older has been unchanged 
since 1955, we can calculate the “would have been” old-age dependency ratio. The discrepancy 
between the conventional old-age dependency ratio and the one we calculated indicates the impact 
of the extension of life expectancy. Under the alternative definition of the elderly, the boundary 
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Fig. 3.3  Elderly as a percentage of total population under conventional and 
alternative definitions of the elderly 
Applying the alternative definition of the elderly also affects the projection 
of  savings with an aging population. The life-cycle theory predicts that the 
household savings rate will decline as the proportion of the elderly in the total 
population increases  because individuals  save while they are employed and 
dissave after retirement.9 Based on a cross-sectional analysis of the relationship 
between  the rate of household savings and the old-age dependency ratio in 
OECD countries in the 1980s, the current household savings rate in Japan will 
fall by more than one-half in response to the projected doubling of the old-age 
dependency ratio (see OECD 1990,75). Because the high level of household 
savings in Japan has been considered one of the major sources of Japan's  high 
economic growth, the falling savings rate may become a major constraint on 
economic growth. 
Applying our definition of the elderly, which shifts according to changes in 
life expectancy, to Horioka's projections of  the future savings rate results in a 
significant difference in the projection of the private savings rate. The critical 
year when Japan's  private savings rate turns negative is later, and the double- 
digit private savings rate is maintained for another decade (fig. 3.4). These 
results are due mainly to a slower increase in old-age dependency resulting 
from a longer working life. 
3.3.2  Labor-Augmenting Technological Progress 
Demographic changes affect labor productivity by causing changes in capi- 
tal intensity, holding the rate of technological change constant. If  we take the 
9. It seems at first glance that the life-cycle theory of savings may not be applicable to Japan 
because households headed by the elderly do save significantly. However, there are various statisti- 
cal biases in this result: first, savings in a self-employed household may incorporate profits from 
business; second, elderly people who live alone are often excluded from the sample; third, the rate 







-1  5 
-20 
Projection based on  the alternative 
.-------_-----.  -.  --. 
"''''''~'  1'1  11  '1  8'1  1  It  18  I'''"~''I  '"'1 
capital stock as given, reduced population growth would raise the capital-labor 
ratio, leading to higher labor productivity. Alternatively, a falling labor supply 
would indicate less need for investment to maintain a certain level of  labor 
productivity  and thus would increase the share of  output available for con- 
sumption, assuming an optimum capital-labor ratio in the economy. This "con- 
sumption dividend," associated with population  aging, would counteract the 
negative  effects  on  per capita  consumption  resulting  from the  burden  of 
the increased old-age dependency ratio and of the lower average quality of the 
labor force due to an increasing proportion of older workers. 
A cross-country comparison among the major OECD countries implies that 
a significant negative relationship exists between growth of the labor force and 
total factor productivity (fig. 3.5). That is, with a  1 percent decline in labor 
force growth, total factor productivity growth of 0.4 percent is induced mainly 
through labor-augmenting technological change or the more efficient use of 
scarcer labor. Whether this relationship in the cross section of the OECD coun- 
tries may apply to future developments in Japan is discussed below. 
Historical evidence in Japan suggests that the growth of labor productivity 
has largely exceeded that of the labor force; the labor force grew an average of 
1.1 percent a year in the 1970-90  period, while productivity grew 3 percent a 
year. The greater growth in productivity is the result of a consistent rise in the 
capital-labor ratio over the same period, with the capital stock growing at a 
rate exceeding the growth of the labor force. As a result of the improvement 
in labor productivity, the average real wage in Japan rose continuously  (fig. 
3.6A). 
Such a continuous increase in the capital-labor ratio is often attributed to 
rises with age, thus the relatively poor elderly are dropped from statistics that are measured on a 
household basis (for details, Horioka 1991; Yashiro, chap. 4 in this volume). 70  Naohiro Yashiro and Akiko Sato Oishi 
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Fig. 3.5  Total factor productivity and labor force growth, 1980-91 
Source: OECD, National Accounts  1979-1 991 (Paris, 1993); OECD, Main Economic Iiidicntors 
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labor-saving investment, which is stimulated by the increasing scarcity of labor 
and the  reduction  of  working hours.  That  is,  given  an output  level,  higher 
wages relative to the return  on capital would lead to the application of more 
capital-intensive  production.  However,  while  the  higher  capital-labor  ratio 
would raise labor productivity, it should also lower capital productivity, leading 
to a falling rate of return on capital. This adverse effect of accumulated labor- 
saving investment would naturally discourage business investment in the long 
run,  and  labor productivity  would  eventually  stop  increasing.  This  is  the 
“steady-state equilibrium” in which there is no productivity growth since net 
capital stocks are growing at the same rate as the labor force. Nevertheless, the 
return  on capital (approximated by the real long-term interest rate) has been 
relatively stable in postwar Japan, despite a continuous increase in the capital- 
labor ratio (fig. 3.6B).  This stability implies that technological changes have 
prevented the profitability of capital from falling. 
The divergent movements of  the returns on labor and capital  can be ex- 
plained in the following way: In the Cobb-Douglas production function, labor 
productivity is expressed as a function of the capital-labor ratio, where labor 
is expressed in efficiency units: 
YIL = A*F(K/AL), 
where  Y is GNP, L is labor, K  is capital,  and A  is efficiency of  labor. With 
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Fig. 3.6  A, Change of real wage in Japan and the United States; B, Return on 
capital in Japan and the United States 
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capital would be at the steady-state level. Whereas labor productivity in effi- 
ciency units would be stable, the return on labor would increase at a rate equiv- 
alent to changes in  labor efficiency. Thus, the historical movements of  real 
wages and profitability of capital in Japan can be fully explained by the intro- 
duction of labor-augmenting technological progress. 
The existence of labor-augmenting technological change does not necessar- 
ily indicate  causality  vis-a-vis  changes in  the  labor  supply associated  with 
demographic  shifts. On the one hand, given technological change, the labor 
supply may be adjusted to maintain the rate of real wage increase at the histori- 
cal average, The fact that working hours fell most dramatically in the period 
when wage growth was high with tightening labor market conditions may sup- 
port this view. On the other hand, labor-augmenting technological change may 
be induced by a decline in the labor supply. The relative importance of these 
mechanisms can only be assessed empirically. 
There are contradicting views regarding the effects of the demographic shift 
on technological change in the coming decades. The pessimistic school holds 
that the growth of business investment is likely to slow as the population ages 
because a society with a larger proportion of  older people loses some of its 
dynamism, and the slower population growth and the lackluster consumption 
market  will discourage  innovation  (see Cutler et al.  1990). By contrast, the 
optimistic school argues that an increasing labor shortage accompanying the 
aging process will stimulate incentives to use more efficiently existing human 
resources,  particularly  older and  female workers,  who  have  been  assigned 
somewhat peripheral roles under current Japanese employment practices. 
3.4  Empirical Studies 
3.4.1  Structure of the Model 
The model consists of equations for savings, investment, labor productivity, 
and the long-term interest rate, which are estimated by ordinary least squares 
and are based on annual data from 1958-92. The exogenous variables are pop- 
ulation and its age composition. The rate of inflation  during the  simulation 
period is assumed to be 1.7 percent a year, which is the average for the period 
The ratio of  savings to GNP is a function of  the young-age and old-age 
dependency ratios and of real per capita GNP growth, which is based on Horio- 
ka’s (1991) formulation (see below for details). The ratio of business invest- 
ment to GNP is a Solow-type formulation based on the growth of the working- 
age population  (20-64  years of age) and the interest rate, which is a proxy 
for the return on capital. Labor productivity is expressed as a function of the 
capital-labor ratio. The long-term interest rate is determined by changes in the 
savings-investment balance. A detailed explanation of each equation follows. 
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Savings 
The savings function is based on a modified life-cycle model, explaining the 
national savings rate by  old-age and young-age dependency ratios and per cap- 
ita economic growth. Also, the life cycle model is applied to the national sav- 
ings rate, instead of the household savings rate. This is based on the assumption 
that households consider their savings substitutable for those of the corporate 
and government sectors, which  is an awkward assumption in the short run 
but less so in long-term projections. Higher income growth raises the savings 
rate mainly because savings for future consumption are considered a “luxury 
good” and the capacity to save increases with income level. Savings are in 
gross terms, including depreciation of corporate and housing stocks. This may 
not be appropriate for examining the international comparison of savings rates 
per se, as already pointed out by  Horioka (1991), but our major interest here 
is to focus on the savings-investment balance in the conventional definition, 
which is consistent with the current external balance. 
Business Investment 
Gross investment consists of business, housing, government, and inventory 
investment, the last two of which are set unchanged in the projection period. 
The long-run trend of  business investment is based on labor force growth, 
given an optimal capital-labor ratio, and return on capital. We assume the fol- 
lowing Cobb-Douglas production function:1° 
Y = L*(K/L)‘ 
where Y is real GNP, L is the working-age population (20-64  years of age), K 
is gross capital, and e is a parameter representing the share of capital income. 
Assuming that the long-term real interest rate (r)  equals the marginal return on 
capital, the following equation is derived: 
e 
(K/L)’  ~ 
r = 
In the “steady-state equilibrium,” the growth of  capital stocks equals that of 
labor in efficiency units: 
dKIK = n + t, 
where n is the growth of the population aged 20-64  and t is the rate of labor- 
augmenting technological change. 
Based on the above equations, the ratio of business investment to GNP is 
expressed by the following: 
10. The estimation of the long-run business investment function derived from the production 
function is based on Noguchi (1987. 1989, 1990). 74  Naohiro Yashiro and Akiko Sat0 Oishi 
-  dKIK  - 
(LIK)  (KIL)' 
dKIK 
(KIL)  ~  I( KIL)' 
(KIL)' - I 
- e(dKIK) 
e(K/L)' - I 
-  -  ~~~~~~ 
-  dKIK  - 
-- 
- e(n + t) 
- 
r 
Using this equation, we can estimate the capital share parameter (e)  and labor- 
augmenting technological changes (t):  II 
IOIY = ea(n/r)  + et*(l/r). 
The estimates of the capital share (e)  and the average rate of increase of the 
labor efficiency unit are 26.4 and 4 percent, respectively, which seem to be 
within the plausible range.12 The rate of return on capital (r)  is a function of 
the savings-investment balance (see below for details). 
Residential Investment 
Residential investment is considered to be affected mainly by the population 
of young adults and the cost of financing. We use the population aged 20-34, 
which represents potential purchasers of houses. The indicator of the cost of 
financing for housing is the interest rate, which is set to be the same as the 
rate of return on capital in the previous equation. We formulate the residential 
investment equation as follows: 
IHIY = f(PT2034, r), 
where IHIY is the ratio of residential investment to GNP, PT2034 is the popula- 
tion aged 20-34,  and r is the interest rate. 
11. Theoretically, n(r) rather than n(t - 1) should be used in the estimation. However, as No- 
guchi (1990) pointed out, estimation with n(r) provides poor R',  so the equation with n(r - 1) 
is adopted. 
12. This is comparable to the results by  Noguchi (1990), which were 24.6 and 3.55 percent, 
respectively. The difference between Noguchi's results and ours is mainly due to the longer estima- 
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Interest Rate 
Many previous studies assumed that interest rates are exogenous in long- 
term projections based on the “small country” model. However, Japan is no 
longer a small country, particularly in international financial markets, and the 
decline in Japan’s net capital exports should affect both domestic and world 
interest rates. In our model, the interest rate is set as a function of net external 
surplus in Japan; thus, the excess savings over investment (i.e., the current ex- 
ternal surplus) tends to lower the interest rate. Historical evidence implies that 
an increase in the net external surplus of  1 percent of GNP translates into a 
0.55 percent decline in the long-term interest rate. This interest rate function 
constitutes one of the feedback mechanisms in our model, where excess invest- 
ment over savings raises the interest rate to discourage domestic investment, 
thereby restoring the equilibrium. 
3.4.2  Simulation Results 
The major results of the estimated equations and their explanations are sum- 
marized in the appendix. These equations do not necessarily track the fluctua- 
tions in the actual variables, reflected in low Durbin-Watson statistics, mainly 
because these are very simple equations neglecting several important variables 
explaining cyclical fluctuations. However, a major aim of this model is to ex- 
plain the long-run trends of savings and investment and to see the net effects 
of  changes in the  assumptions  or in  exogenous  variables, rather  than  pin- 
pointing  the  economic  growth rates or savings rates in a particular year, as 
we would do in short-term projections. In addition, including many economic 
variables would require projections of their long-term changes, which causes 
various difficulties. Using population variables, estimates of which are avail- 
able up to the year 2025 and are on average more reliable than long-term pro- 
jections of other economic variables, avoids this problem to some extent. For 
the projection of the population and its age structure, we use the medium esti- 
mates by the IPP, mainly to compare the results of our simulation with those 
in earlier studies. 
These equations are solved simultaneously to maintain consistency between 
the interactions of the variables. When we use these estimated equations for 
long-term  projections,  several procedures  concerning  the  labor supply  and 
labor-augmenting  technological  change are included. Many previous studies 
took these economic variables to be unchanged despite the rapid pace of popu- 
lation aging. However, treating these key variables as exogenous often leads to 
“extreme results,” mainly due to the lack of  adjustment mechanisms  in  the 
projection period. In the following sections, major simulation results based on 
the above model are shown (table 3.3).  Care must be taken in interpreting the 
results because the “baseline case” here is not the most plausible one, as in 
most other macroeconomic simulations. On the contrary, here “baseline” indi- Table 3.3  Simulation Results (period average) 
Growth in Per Capita Real Income  Growth in Real GNP  Gross Saving 
(% per annum)  (% per annum)  (% of GNP) 
Period  Baseline  Sim. 1  Sim. 2  Sim. 3  Baseline  Sim. 1  Sim. 2  Sim. 3  Baseline  Sim. 1  Sim. 2  Sim. 3 
1980s  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.6  4.2  4.2  4.2  4.2  31.7  31.7  31.7  31.7 
1990s  2.1  2.0  2.0  1.7  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.3  31.3  31.3  31.0  31.1 
2000s  0.8  1  .o  1.2  0.7  1  .o  1.3  1.4  1  .O  22.9  23.1  23.6  22.9 
2010s  0.0  0.5  0.7  0.2  -0.1  0.3  0.6  0.2  10.4  10.7  12.6  10.5 
2020-2025  0.6  0.5  0.8  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.0  5.9  5.9  9.1  5.8 
Interest Rate  Gross Nonresidential  Fixed Investment  Gross Investment 
(%)  (% of  GNP)  (% of GNP) 
Period  Baseline  Sim. 1  Sim. 2  Sim. 3  Baseline  Sim. 1  Sim. 2  Sim. 3  Baseline  Sim. 1  Sim. 2  Sim. 3 
1980s  6.6  6.6  6.6  6.6  18.1  18.1  18.1  18.1  29.6  29.6  29.6  29.6 
1990s  7.0  7.0  7.1  7.4  18.5  18.3  18.3  17.8  30.2  30.1  29.9  30.8 
2000s  8.0  8.2  8.3  9.2  12.4  13.0  13.7  11.7  23.5  24.1  24.8  25.6 
2010s  10.1  10.7  10.3  12.2  8.3  9.9  10.9  8.8  15.1  16.5  17.6  19.1 
2020-2025  12.2  12.3  11.4  14.1  8.3  8.6  9.7  7.5  13.8  14.0  15.4  17.0 Saving-Investment Balance  Growth in Working Population 
(8  of GNP)  (8  of  GNP)  RetireWorking Population 
Period  Baseline  Sim. 1  Sim. 2  Sim. 3  Baseline  Sim. I  Sim. 2  Sim. 3  Baseline  Sim. 1  Sim. 2  Sim. 3 
~~  ~  ~~  ~ 
1980s  2.2  2.2  2.2  2.2  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.9  0.168  0.168  0.168  0.168 
1990s  1.1  1.2  1.1  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.6  0.230  0.230  0.185  0.221 
2000s  -0.6  -1.0  -1.2  -2.8  -0.5  -0.5  -0.4  -0.4  0.317  0.317  0.243  0.299 
2010s  -4.7  -5.8  -5.0  -8.6  -0.9  -0.9  -0.7  -0.7  0.428  0.428  0.317  0.395 
2020-2025  -7.9  -8.1  -6.4  -11.2  -0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.479  0.479  0.346  0.436 
Sources: Ministry of  Health and Welfare (1992); Economic Planning Agency, Report on National Accountsfrom 1955 to 1969 (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 
19881, Report on National Accountsfrom 1955 to 1989 (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, 1991),  Report on Revised National Accounts on the Basis of  1985 (Tokyo: 
Government Printing Office, 1990),  Annual Report on National Accounts (Tokyo: Government Printing Office, various issues). 
Notes; Simulation 1 assumes that there will be labor-augmenting technological progress (0.8 percent for each 1 percent decline in working population). Simulation 2 
includes the influence of longer working life, assuming the same equation for technological progress as in Simulation 1. Simulation 3 considers the effect of the 
increase in foreign workers, assuming the same equation for technological progress as in Simulation 1. 78  Naohiro Yashiro and Akiko Sat0 Oishi 
cates conventional cases applied in previous  studies, which often report ex- 
treme results for their projections. We consider simulation case 2 to show the 
most plausible picture because it takes into account various counteracting ef- 
fects that would be induced as a result of population aging. 
Baseline Projection 
The  major  characteristics  of  the  baseline  projection  using  conventional 
methods are as follows: First, the projected national savings ratio will fall with 
a sharply increasing dependency ratio and slower economic growth. While the 
savings ratio will decline only slightly during the  1990s (from an average of 
3 1.7 percent in the 1980s to 3 1.3 percent in the 1990s), it will start to decline 
rapidly after the year 2000 and reach a historical low after the year 2020 (the 
baseline  case in table 3.3). This baseline  projection  of  the national  savings 
ratio is basically consistent with that of Horioka because both are based on the 
conventional definition of the elderly (65 years of age and over).'? 
Second, the fall in the ratios of business investment and national savings to 
GNP in the baseline projection  is due to the following factor: the decline in 
the labor supply beyond the year 2000 with no offsetting movements in techno- 
logical change should lower the amount of capital needed to maintain the opti- 
mum capital-labor ratio. Because the decline in the investment rate will be less 
rapid  than  that  in the savings rate, the external account will  show a deficit 
beyond the year 2000, and the deficit will continue to widen, mainly as a result 
of the sharp decline in the savings rate. 
Third, the widening current external deficit will boost interest rates to absorb 
foreign capital so that it can be financed. Even if we assume that these huge 
inflows of foreign capital are sustainable, GNP in real terms will begin declin- 
ing after the year 2010. This rather unrealistic situation often leads to the pessi- 
mistic view that the current excellent macroeconomic performance in Japan 
cannot be sustained under population aging. 
Alternative Simulation5 
The above picture of population aging will be modified by  introducing en- 
dogenous labor-augmenting  technological progress and increases in the elderly 
labor supply. First, accounting for labor-augmenting technological change in 
simulation  1 would stimulate investment. We assume that the past relationship 
in Japanese industries, in which a 1 percent decline in labor supply has induced 
a 0.8 percent increase in labor prod~ctivity,'~  after accounting for an increase 
13. Care must be taken when comparing the results of  our baseline projection with  those of 
Horioka's in the following two points: First, our baseline projection is on the national savings rate, 
while Horioka's published one is on the private savings rate, excluding government savings. Sec- 
ond, our results are based on simultaneous equations of  savings, investment, labor productivity, 
and so on, while Horioka's are based on a single equation. 
14. This is based on the following equation using cross-sectional data for 21  industries on the 
average labor productivity growth between 1961 and 1990 for six periods: 79  Population Aging and the Savings-Investment Balance in Japan 
in capital stocks and initial productivity level, will basically  hold  in coming 
decades.Is As the increase in capital stocks and initial differences in productiv- 
ity levels by industry are accounted for, this increase in labor productivity is 
approximated as labor-augmenting technological change, which is induced by 
the scarcity of labor. With the assumption of endogenous technological change, 
the investment ratio will fall more moderately through the 1990s and beyond, 
with higher growth in labor productivity and GNP. 
Second, the sharp fall in the national savings ratio in the baseline projection 
depends critically on how the elderly population,  a key explanatory variable 
for the savings equation, is defined. In other words, this baseline projection is 
limited  to the case in which  the elderly’s working  years remain  unchanged 
despite the extension of  their life expectancy.  In simulation 2, we apply an 
alternative definition of the elderly  in  which the cutoff  age between  work- 
ing population and elderly shifts upward as life expectancy increases. In this 
case, it is assumed that people will adjust their working years in anticipation 
of longer life expectancy. Thus, the old-age dependency ratio will rise more 
slowly (see fig. 3.3), and the decline in the working population will be offset 
by about 26 percent due to this increase in the labor force throughout the pro- 
jection period. With the additional  labor supply and the  smaller size of the 
retired population, the national savings ratio will fall more gradually, resulting 
in a national savings rate of 9.1 percent rather than 5.9 percent for the period 
2020-25.  This result is more reasonable  than  the baseline projection  in the 
sense that the effects from tightening labor market conditions  and improve- 
ments in the health, educational attainment, and skills of the elderly are ac- 
counted for.lh  Also, the projected deficit in the current external account will be 
less drastic, and the interest rate levels needed to finance the external deficit 
will be lower than in the baseline projection. 
Third, we simulate the effects of an increase in the labor supply through the 
importation  of  foreign  workers,  which  is often  suggested  as an  alternative 
means to offset the negative impacts of population aging. In simulation 3, the 
In(Y/L) = -2.150 -  0.817 InL + 0.056 In(Y*/L*) + 0.420 InK, 
R  = 0.583, 
(-9.246)(-9.078!  (4.042)  (3.839) 
where Y is real GNP, K is capital, and L is labor. An asterisk indicates the initial period. 
15. The ratio of induced labor-augmenting technological change may well be overestimated, as 
it includes the autonomous  improvement in quality of  labor and capital in the past. Also, the 
possibility of an increase in foreign direct investment induced by a labor shortage is not accounted 
for. However, the rationale behind this assumption of continuous labor-augmenting technological 
change toward the year 2025 is that there is still plenty of room for improving labor productivity 
in Japanese industries, particularly in the service sector; thus, the reduction in the labor supply is 
likely to improve average labor productivity, as we see in the cases of major European countries. 
16. The rate of college enrollment, including junior colleges, has been at a plateau of 40 percent 
since the late 1970s. Assuming a constant enrollment rate at the present level in the coming de- 
cades, the share of college graduates in the total population will nse from the current 20 percent 
to 40 percent. 80  Naohiro Yashiro and Akiko Sat0 Oishi 
number of foreign workers is assumed to be equivalent to the number of addi- 
tional older workers in simulation 2, simply to compare the  result^.'^ In this 
case, although the additional supply of workers is the same as in simulation 2, 
the ratio of the retired population  to the working population  will be higher 
because older workers will have to compete for job opportunities with foreign 
workers and some of them will be driven out of the labor market. In addition, 
foreign workers are assumed to transfer their savings to their home country, 
resulting in a lower national savings rate than in simulation 2. This effect is 
measured by not counting additional foreign workers in the savings equation. 
Major implications from this simulation are that, although importing foreign 
workers will partly  relieve  the labor shortage, a higher old-age dependency 
ratio will reduce national savings, leading to a rise in the interest rate. 
Finally, if we modify the model by fixing the real interest rate for the projec- 
tion  period  at 5 percent,  the net external deficit beyond  the  year 2015 will 
expand to unrealistically high levels. This result indicates the importance of 
the feedback channel, which prevents the widening of savings-investment im- 
balances arising from decreasing national savings. 
3.5  Policy Implications 
Although  major challenges to the Japanese economy will result from the 
shrinking labor force and the increasing share of the elderly in the total popula- 
tion in the coming decades, they can be overcome with appropriate policies. 
The major policy implications of the above simulations follow. 
First, the key to overcoming the increasing labor shortage in  the coming 
“aged society” is to stimulate labor-augmenting technological change. Average 
labor productivity in Japanese industry (GDP per person employed), measured 
at purchasing power parity in 1990, is still lower than that of the United States 
by 26 percent and lower than that of France and Germany by 28 and 12 percent, 
respectively. Accounting for differences in working hours further increases the 
gap between Japan and other countries (Japan Productivity Center 1992). With 
the low level of  average labor productivity in Japan, there is much room to 
improve the efficiency of  the existing labor force, particularly in the service 
sector. In addition, the quality of the labor force will continuously  improve 
through the 2010s as long as the current high level of college enrollment  is 
maintained. Relaxing regulations that keep excess labor in less efficient sectors 
of the economy would be an effective policy to stimulate labor-augmenting 
technological  change.18 In this respect,  the further opening of the domestic 
17. The accumulated increase in the working-age population from the baseline case in  2025 
would be 6.9 million (5 percent of the total population). 
18. An example of restricting competition in the distribution sector is the Large Scale Retailer 
Law, which de facto requires supermarkets and department stores to obtain the agreement of small 
retailers in the neighborhood in order to open or to extend operating hours. The law effectively 
deters new entries, and rescinding it should improve the efficiency of the distribution sector. 81  Population Aging and the Savings-Investment Balance in Japan 
market to foreign firms, raising the ratio of manufactured imports to GNP, is an 
important way to stimulate competition with Japanese firms, as well as import 
foreign labor in the form of foreign manufactured products.  Iy 
Second, the higher labor force participation and longer working life of the 
elderly will be important factors in determining the growth of the labor force 
and savings rate in the coming decades. Current labor market institutions and 
practices have important implications in this respect. In Japan, most large firms 
set the mandatory retirement age at 60 years, although reemployment is pos- 
sible for a few additional years. “Retirement”  in Japan does not necessarily 
mean withdrawal from the labor market; it often means a move to a different 
firm at lower wages and with less favorable working conditions. Indeed, the 
rate of unemployment is particularly high in the 55-64  age group.2” 
There are two ways to cope with the problem of unemployment in this age 
group. One is by extending the mandatory retirement age, particularly since 
the  pensionable  age for Employees’  Public  Insurance  is to be  raised  to 65 
years. However, with a continuously rising share of older workers in the labor 
market, an increase in wage costs under the seniority-based wage structure will 
be inevitable, leading to the letting go of older workers even before the current 
mandatory retirement age.21  Another solution is to modify Japanese employ- 
ment practices so that they accommodate increasing mobility across firms. Be- 
cause mandatory retirement is an inevitable consequence of rigid employment 
security and the seniority-based wage structure, measures to mobilize the ex- 
isting labor force would increase efficiency in Japanese labor markets, particu- 
larly for older workers. 
In summary, although the rapidly proceeding aging of the Japanese popu- 
lation  is  a  major  challenge  to the  Japanese  economy,  its  negative  impacts 
on  savings  and  investment  can  be  largely  reduced  by  stimulating  labor- 
augmenting technological change and extending the working life of the elderly. 
Projections  of  the Japanese  economy  differ  largely  depending on  whether 
these forces offsetting population aging are accounted for. Many previous stud- 
ies neglecting  these counteracting  effects  produced  a pessimistic  picture  of 
Japan’s economy under population aging, but if appropriate policies are imple- 
mented the future need not be dark. 
19. Assuming that capital-labor ratios in the 13 Japanese manufacturing industries were fixed at 
their 1960 levels, the increase in the import ratio (manufactured imports to value-added imports) 
in the respective industries between 1960 and 1990 should have reduced the demand for labor by 
1.26 million workers (9.6 percent of total manufacturing  employment) through an increase  in 
imports from labor-intensive industries and a relative decline in the share of those industries in 
total manufacturing. 
20. While the average rate of unemployment in Japan was 2.1 percent in  1992, that in the elderly 
group was particularly high; the rate of unemployment for men in the 55-64  age group was 3.2 
percent. Unemployment rates of the elderly are higher than those of youth, which is a cause of 
friction in Japan. 
21. One way  to let go of employees before the mandatory retirement age is to transfer them to 
subsidiary companies by order of the parent company. Another is to encourage them to quite volun- 
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Utilization rate (1990 = 1) 
Hours worked (hours per month) 
Depreciation rate (in real terms, percent) 
Ratio of gross private nonresidential fixed investment to 
gross nonresidential 
Estimated Equations 
Investment (nonresidential) rate equation 
Sample period: 1956-92 
(Al)  10% = 26.3524*PRRATIO (-1)  + 
(5.56) 
Adj. RA2  = 0.234, 
Residential investment rate equation 
Sample period: 1958-92 
fixed investment 
106.637*INVRMAA% (- l), 
(15.15) 
D.W. = 0.988. 
(A2)  IH% = -9.81875  + 0.0006924uPT2034 -  0.32088*RMAA%, 
(-7.52)  (1  3.47)  (-3.61) 
Adj. RA2  = 0.841,  D.W. = 0.815. 
Savings rate equation 
Sample period: 1958-92 
(A3)  STOT% = 65.96 -91.967*OLD  -  41.917"YOUNG 
(12.20)(-5.19)  (-7.25) 
+ 0.6364*GRGNPPC% (- l), 
(6.07) 
Adj. RA2  = 0.688,  D.W. = 1.092. 
Production function 
Sample period: 1970-92 
(A4)  In  RGNPPMH = -5.96263  + 0.57536*1n ((KR*UTRATE) / 
(- 199.69)  (55.89) 
(POPTOTR*HOUR)), 
Adj. RA2  = 0.993,  D.W. = 1.515. 
Interest rate equation 
Sample period: 1958-92 
(A51  RMAA% = 7.83246 -0.55126*BALANCEA, 
(63.55)  (-7.53) 
Adj. RA2  = 0.621,  D.W. = 1.012. 84  Naohiro Yashiro and Akiko Sato Oishi 
Investment (nonresidential) rate equation for simulation 2 
Sample period: 1956-92 
(A6) 10% = 20.9038*PRRATIO (- 1) + 11 1.61  1  *INVRMAA% (- l), 
(4.22)  (14.09) 
Adj. Rfi2  = 0.125, 
Savings rate equation for simulation 2 
Sample period: 1958-92 
D.W. = 1.125. 
(A7)  STOT% = 65.444 -  126.83*OLD -  36.781"YOUNG 
(10.47)  (-4.46)  (-6.41) 
+ 0.73 158*GRGNPPC% (- l), 
Adj. RA2  = 0.637, 
(6.50) 
D.W. = 1.244. 
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Fig. 3A.l  Gross nonresidential fixed investment (as percentage of GNP) 
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Fig. 3A.4  GNP per man-hour (million 1985 yen) 
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Identities 




IDENT EQI5  NGNP = RGNP85*PGNP85/100 
IDENT EQ16  RGNP85 = RGNPPMH*POPTOTR*HOUR 
IDENT EQ17 
IDENT EQI8 
IDENT EQ19  IG = NGNP*0.052 
IDENT EQI10  IV = NGNP*0.005 
IDENT EQIl  1 
IDENT EQI12  INVRMAA% = l/(RMAA%) 
IDENT EQI 13 
IDENT EQI 14 
IDENT EQIl5 
RGNPPC = RGNP85POPTOTR 
GRGNPPC% = RGNPPCRGNPPC (- 1)*  100 - 100 
KR = KR (- 1) + IOP85*1000 -  DEPR/100*KR (-1) 
IFIX = IO%*NGNP/100 + IH%*NGNP/100 + IG 
ITOT% = (IFIX + IV)/NGNP* 100 
BALANCE = STOT% -  ITOT% 
PRRATIO = [(PT2064/PT2064 (- 1))*  100 -  100]/RMAA% 
OLD = PT650V/PT2064 
YOUNG = PTO 19PT2064 
BALANCEA = (BALANCE + BALANCE (-  1) + 
BALANCE (-2))/3 
IDENT EQI16  I0  = I0%/100*NGNP 
IDENT EQI17  I085 = IO/(PIO/100) 
IDENT EQI18  IOP85 = 1085*ALPHA 
Assumptions 
Data on future population are computed from data on the medium estimates 
of population by age group presented in Ministry of Health and Welfare (1992). 
IG (government investment) is set at 5.2 percent of GNP during the simula- 
tion period. 
IV (change in inventories) is set at 0.5 percent of GNP during the simula- 
tion period. 
Inflation rate is assumed to be 1.7 percent a year. 
PI0  is assumed to rise 0.1 percent a year. 
UTRATE (utilization rate) is set at 0.945 during the simulation period. 
Future values of HOURS (hours worked) are calculated based on Economic 
DEPR (depreciation rate in real terms) during the simulation period is as- 
ALPHA is set at 0.91 during the simulation period. 
Planning Agency (1991a, 1991b). 
sumed to be 4.89 percent a year. 
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